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Slicing the Rent-Seeking Onion: Why Differential
Rent-Seeking Explains the Competitive
Disadvantage of United States Sports
Franchises in Canada
Ethan Glass
INTRODUCTION
As a form of entertainment sports have the ability to create memorable
events and develop memories that mark that passage of time and bond
generations through shared activities. This romantic bond, coupled
with opportunities to escape from the worries of the day, is what owners
and leagues manipulate to get what they want from governments, fans,
and taxpayers, even in an era of repeated calls for smaller governments
and lower taxes. 
1
Economists find professional sports to be an interesting
model upon which to test their economic theories. 2 This is pri-
marily due to three reasons. First, as the popularity and profit-
ability of professional sports 3 grows,4 its economics become
increasingly important.5 Second, professional sports, more than
1. MARK S. ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS 33 (1997).
2. See SPORToMETRICS (Brian L. Goff& Robert D. Tollison eds., 1990). See
also JESSE W. MARKHAM & PAUL V. TEPLITZ, BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1981) (focusing on the industrial organization, structure, conduct, and
performance of professional baseball).
3. For the purposes of this Note the professional sports discussed will be
Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the National
Hockey League because of their economic size and international franchises.
4. In 1997, Major League Baseball held 2,268 games, sold 63,100,000 tick-
ets, grossed $2,000,000,000 in revenue, and netted an estimated $840,000,000
in revenue. See LEONARD KOPPETT, KOPPETr'S CONCISE HISTORY OF MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL 483 (1998). See also ANN E. WEISS, MONEY GAME$ (1993)
(discussing the professionalization of sports and the extent of sports business);
DALE HOFMANN & MARTIN J. GREENBERG, SPORT$BIz (1989) (discussing sports
as a "modern, merchandising monster"); HOUSE RESEARCH POLICY BRIEF, THE
ECONOMICS OF SPORTS STADIUMS (Minn. 1997) (discussing the municipal bene-
fits of professional sports teams); KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE SPORTS
FRANCHISE GAME 61-72 (1995) (discussing the true value of sports to municipal-
ities); Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should End the Eco-
nomic War Between the States (visited Jan. 29, 2000) <http://
minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1994.html>.
5. See BARRIE HOULIHAN, SPORT & INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1994); DON-
ALD MACINTOSH ET AL., SPORT AND POLITICS IN CANADA (1987); DONALD MACIN-
TOSH & MICHAEL HAWES, SPORT AND CANADIAN DIPLOMACY (1994).
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other corporations, have special positions under the law. For ex-
ample, baseball is exempt from the United States antitrust
statutes,6 which enables economists to focus on rent-seeking and
its effect, 7 and not the legality of the corporate and franchise s
behavior. 9
Third, and finally, economists study professional sports be-
cause professional sports strongly parallel other international
businesses in regulated or restricted industries.' 0 This similar-
ity allows economists to create theories that encourage progress
toward the comparative advantage goals of international trade
agreements like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of
1994 (GATT) and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)."
6. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972) ("[we continue to be
loathe, 50 years after Federal Baseball and almost two decades after Toolson, to
overturn those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has al-
lowed these decisions to stand for so long"), affg Toolson v. New York Yankees,
346 U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953) ("Congress has had [Federal Baseball] under con-
sideration, but has not seen fit to bring such business under these laws by legis-
lation"), affg Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Prof. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922) ("[tlhe business is giving exhi-
bitions of baseball which are purely state affairs [and] not a subject of
commerce").
7. See infra Section I for a definition of rent-seeking.
8. See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAw 352
(1993) (discussing the corporate structure of sports). See also North Am. Soccer
League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1252 (2d Cir. 1982) ("NFL
teams are separate economic entities engaged in a joint venture").
9. Baseball (and sports business generally) has a rich legal tradition in
the United States courts and universities. See generally ROGER I. ABRAmS,
LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW (1998) (detailing the history of baseball in
the United States legal system); BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MmD
(Spencer Weber Waller et al. eds., 1995) (exploring the "baseball/law nexus"); 2
ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAW AND THE BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS
INDUSTRIES (1993) (explaining the development of sports business and associ-
ated legal problems); 1 ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAW AND THE
BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES (1986) (explaining the development of
sports business and associated legal problems); GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS
BUSINESS (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974) (analyzing the operation of professional
team sports); GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAw (1986) (surveying
sports law); LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAw (1977) (detail-
ing legal issues relating to professional sports); SPORTS LAw AND LEGISLATION
(John Hladczuk et al. eds., 1991) (surveying articles pertaining to sports law).
10. Professional sports are similar to other businesses in this context be-
cause they have to obey the legal rules of labor, corporation, agency, contract,
and the economic rule of supply and demand.
11. See JOHN H. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 7-13, 289-
326, 489-500 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing GATT and NAFTA in depth). This Note
will not discuss comparative advantage or GATT and NAFTA purposes or
provisions.
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This Note argues that rent-seeking, a theory developed in
economic scholarship, 12 explains why United States sports
franchises in Canada do not field competitive teams.' 3 Part I of
this Note uses historical approaches to defining rent-seeking to
create a price-determining equation. Part II examines Major
League Baseball's Canadian franchises, their competitive
problems, the previous explanations for those problems, and the
flaws in those explanations. Finally, Part III concludes that the
Canadian sport franchise disadvantage is due to rent-seeking.
I RENT-SEEKING DEFINED
Rent-seeking is the quotient of the purchaser's alternatives
and the purchaser's competition divided by the competition
against the seller's product and the seller's alternatives to the
purchaser plus an emotional variable, multiplied by a coefficient
converting the ratio into dollars. Part L.A assimilates the influ-
12. Rent-seeking is merely a variation on the theory of supply and demand.
Therefore there are numerous related economic theories that could have been
used to explain the Canadian franchise competitive disadvantage including:
General law/economic theory. See generally Union Oil v. Oppen, 501 F.2d
558, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1974) (using an economic analysis to determine which rule
of law to apply); ADAM SMITH AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
(Robin Paul Malloy & Jerry Evensky eds., 1994) (discussing Adam Smith's phi-
losophy of law and economics); PAUL BuRRows & CENTO G. VELIANOvSKi, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH To LAw (1981) (presenting the strengths and weaknesses
of the economic approach to the law); LAw AND ECONOMICS (Warren J. Samuels
& A. Allan Schmid eds., 1981) (discussing the contemporary institutionalist
study of the economic role of government); KENNETH G. DAu-ScHMIDT &
THOMAS S. ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS ANTHOLOGY (1998) (summarizing the
"classic" law and economics articles); LAw AND ECONOMICS & THE ECONOMICS OF
LEGAL REGULATION (J.-Matthias Graf von der Schulenburg & Gran Skogh eds.,
1986) (selecting papers presented at the conference on "Law and Economics and
the Economics of Legal Regulation," 24-26 of June 1984, Berlin); THOMAS F.
MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAw (1997) (analyzing the economics of tort, con-
tract, property, and litigation); J.M. OLIVER, LAw AND ECONOMICS (1979) (exam-
ining the affect of law on economic behavior); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw (5th ed. 1998) (using economic principles normatively to ex-
plain legal system); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach To Law And
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (adding knowledge about human be-
havior to the law and economics analysis).
Cost-Benefit analysis. See generally McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826
F.2d 1554, 1556 (7th Cir. 1987) (using a formulaic cost-benefit analysis for tort);
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., Inc., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (us-
ing a cost-benefit approach to tort liability).
Coasean Economics. See generally CoASEAN ECONOMICS (Steven G.
Medema ed., 1998) (assessing the development of, tensions within, and pros-
pects for Coasean Economics); Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1960) (asserting that the best cost avoider should bear liability).
13. "Competitive" means both athletically and fiscally competitive.
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ential rent-seeking scholarship into a theory of rent-seeking and
examines that theory's relationship with price theory. Part I.B
converts the rent-seeking theory into an equation, reflecting a
purchasing arrangement that determines the product's eventual
price. Part I.C uses the price equation to mold the rent-seeking
theory into an empirically useful equation.
A. DEFINING RENT-SEEKING: FIRST PRINCIPLES
A plane crash has left an engineer, a chemist, and an econo-
mist on a deserted island. Their only food is a tin can of beans
that washed up on the shore. The plane crash has left the party
without anything but the beans and their knowledge, so they
discuss how to open the can. The engineer says:
I've calculated that the terminal velocity of a one-pound ob-
ject-the weight of the can-thrown to a height of twenty
feet is 183 feet per second. If we place a rock under the can
where the can will impact the ground the seams should
burst without spilling the beans.
The chemist's response is:
That's too risky since we can't be sure we will throw the can
to the correct height. Your plan may result in the loss of
precious food. I've got a better idea. I've calculated the boil-
ing temperature of the beans. Let's start a fire and heat the
can for one minute, thirty-seven seconds the time needed to
just burst the seams. This method is less risky since we can
always push the can off the fire if it starts to burst sooner.
The economist's reaction is:
Both of your methods may work, but they are two compli-
cated. I have a simple solution that will result with success-
fully opening the can every time. Just assume a can
opener. 14
Many scholars, often to the frustration of others,15 have
made different assumptions, not only regarding how to open the
beans' tin can, but even on how to define the tin can. 16 The re-
14. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAw AND ECONOMICS 1
(1983).
15. See Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the
Theoretical and 'Empirical' Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L.
REv. 199 (1988).
16. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding federal
statute that limited rent-seeking through political contributions); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll tax because it,
in light of rent-seeking, deters voting); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
[Vol. 9:691694
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sult is different definitions and theories of rent-seeking. 17 There
are, however, core principles contained within the more influen-
tial theories upon which most scholars agree.' 8 For example,
persons will commit resources, even to the point of waste, where
they produce the greatest profit.19 The result is that individuals
will invest resources in attempts to form monopolies until the
marginal cost equals the properly discounted return.20 When
other persons, or the government, try to help or prevent this ac-
cumulation of resources, those resources that cancel each other
out are wasted. 21 This phenomenon can be isolated by economic
equations representing supply versus demand and potential re-
turns versus resource investment.22 Although this Note will not
address the societal loss of the resource expenditure of compet-
ing persons,23 it is central that persons will commit resources to
areas that will produce the greatest marginal profit (and that it
can be modeled).
The operation of the rent-seeking theory in a particular sys-
tem depends on the level of restriction in that system. There is a
continuum between a system of no restrictions and a perfectly
restricted system. 24 On one side of the continuum is an economy
348 U.s. 483 (1955) (upholding rent-seeking legislation that forbid an optician
from fitting glasses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optome-
trist); ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, MERCANTILISM AS A
RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (1981) (asserting that the balance-of-trade objective of
mercantilism resulted from the relationships between rent-seeking individu-
als); DOUGLAS G. HARTLE, THE EXPENDITURE BUDGET PROCESS OF THE GOVERN-
MENT OF CANADA (1988) (discussing of the process of Canadian budget
expenditures decisions using rent-seeking); GLENN R. PARKER, CONGRESS AND
THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (1996) (discussing that significant factors in moti-
vating legislators to seek Congressional careers are the intrinsic returns associ-
ated with legislative service); GORDON TULLOCK, RENT SEEKING (Edward Elgar
ed., 1993) (ground-breaking work on the definition and application of the rent-
seeking theory); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley
et al eds., 1988) (collecting theoretical, empirical, and institutional articles).
17. See supra note 16.
18. Rent-seeking is a sophisticated theory with considerable scholarship.
This summary is by no means exhaustive. This Part is a sampling of the writ-
ing that most influenced this Note.
19. Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5
W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
20. See id. at 230.
21. See id.
22. See id at 224.
23. See infra note 37.
24. See Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Soci-
ety, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 291, 302 (1974) (stating that persons will expend re-
sources to compete for licenses when imports are limited by quantitative
restrictions and marking the introduction of the term "rent-seeking").
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with no restrictions. 25 Entrepreneurs would seek windfall gains
by adopting new technology, anticipating market shifts, etc.26
On the other side of the continuum is an economy with perfect
restrictions, which would have such persuasive regulations that
rent reeking would be the only route to gain.27 In reality, all
market economies have some restrictions that generate higher
profits for sellers and higher costs for purchasers. 28 Those
higher profits and costs are called "rents."29 In such a system,
entrepreneurs devote time and resources to capturing windfall
rents.
3 0
These behaviors are not only exhibited by living, breathing
humans. Bureaucratic institutions behave like rent-seeking in-
dividuals. 3 1 Each institution acts to attract a more favorable
distribution of government production rights3 2 and this competi-
tion leads to bureaucratic inefficiencies. 3 3 Therefore, rent-seek-
ing is a balance of competing forces: supply versus demand and
potential returns versus resource investment. 34 This balance il-
lustrates that persons are willing to invest resources in attempts
to achieve a profit status until the profit margin is eliminated. 3
5
When supply is restricted by quantitative restrictions, persons
and institutions will expend resources to compete for the limited
supply.3 6
This statement of rent-seeking is difficult to apply because
of its breadth, so a closer examination is needed. Rent-seeking
is the tendency of an expected gain to be translated into costs
through competitive efforts, 37 explained as a pricing3 8 arrange-
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Krueger, supra note 24.
31. See Roger L. Faith, Rent-Seeking Aspects of Bureaucratic Competition,
in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SocIETY 332, 342 (James Buchanan
et al., eds. 1980).
32. See id.
33. See id. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
34. See Tullock, supra note 19.
35. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
36. See Krueger, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
37. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 41 n.3. Posner focuses on the societal
"costs" of rent-seeking. He sees a problem with rent-seeking in the following
situation. A ship is abandoned with $1 million in property. It will cost
$250,000 to claim the property. Four individual parties expend the $250,000 to
recover the $1 million but only one is successful. The total cost to society is $1
million and the total benefit is $1 million. Had only one party searched for, and
found, the property the cost to society would have been $250,000 with the same
696 [Vol. 9:691
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ment, illustrated by an equation. The "expected gain" is the
benefit the seller will receive from the sale of the property;
money is often an expected gain from the sale of property. The
"competitive efforts" are multiple sellers trying to attract a pur-
chaser through incentives; lowering the asking price of property
may be a competitive effort. When a seller uses competitive ef-
forts to attract a purchaser, the seller incurs costs; 3 9 as a seller
lowers the asking price of property, she will inevitably receive
less compensation for that property then before she lowered the
price. Therefore, the "tendency" is that the seller, anticipating
the expected gain from the sale and attracting purchasers
through competitive efforts, will decrease the price resulting in
costs to the seller. 40 Any fiscally sound seller will bind its costs
so that a premium of its expected gain is preserved while opti-
mizing its competitive efforts.41 The aforementioned theory is
simply an equation determining price by competition. So, to
more easily and completely understand rent-seeking, pricing
must be addressed.
B. CONSTRUCTING THE PRICING EQUATION
The pricing of property can be explained by an equation that
takes into account sellers' and purchasers' needs to sell and buy
benefit. Therefore, society lost $750,000 by the four parties competing. See id.
at 41. This is Posner's "tendency of an [individual] expected gain to be trans-
lated into [societal] costs through [individual] competitive efforts." The "ex-
pected gain" is the $1 million, the "competitive efforts" are the expenditures in
pursuit of the "expected gain," and the "costs" is the $750,000 difference be-
tween the "expected gain" and the "competitive efforts." Posner uses personal
expected gain and personal competitive efforts to show societal costs. This Note
uses personal expected gain and personal competitive efforts to show personal
costs. The causal connection is much more clear because the $750,000 differ-
ence is not clearly a societal cost because the money is transferred to others in
society. It is more of a societal shift. However, there is clearly a personal cost of
$250,000 for each group that does not find the treasure. Therefore, this Note is
less concerned with the question of whether rent-seeking hurts or benefits soci-
ety or individuals, just whether it helps explain United States-Canadian sports
competition disadvantages.
38. "Pricing," "property," "purchase" and other similar terms are not used
here as terms-of-art but as general descriptors of the sale transaction.
39. The term "costs" is used in a different manner but for the same idea
than earlier. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Note 29 (and accompa-
nying text) refers to the seller seeking rents when the purchaser's opportunity
is limited due to quantitative restrictions, thus driving price up. However, here
the opportunity to sell is limited, so the sellers are competing for purchasers,
thus driving price down.
40. The tendency is also the attraction of the buyers to the transaction that
creates the greatest profit. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 20, 35 and accompanying text.
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respectively, where "need" is the term describing competitive ef-
forts. In a standard sales transaction,42 the seller's need is the
ratio between her competition, other sellers, and her substitut-
able alternatives, purchasers. The purchaser's need is the ratio
between his competition, other purchasers, and his substitut-
able alternatives, sellers.
The following price equation helps to understand rent-seek-
ing because it isolates the factors that contribute to it. The
seller's and purchaser's needs are compared to determine the
sale price. For example, assume A is the owner of property and
wants to sell that property to a prospective purchaser, X, to be
used in X's business. Under normal circumstances, A would sell
the property to X at a price (P) determined by X's need to buy the
property (X,,) divided A's need to sell the property (An) plus a
variable (k) representing the emotional necessity to buy (k.) and
sell (ka) times a constant coefficient (c) that translates the needs
into actual dollars. 43 Therefore,
P(n)=c(- +k) where X,, An>O and k=k,-k,.
represents price as a ratio of the seller's and purchaser's needs
due to competition.
The equation is better understood by example. Assume for
the moment that A and X are the only two parties to the transac-
tion. When A and X are at par needs the property should sell at
the coefficient translating need into dollars.4 A "par" need is
one no greater and no less than any other actor would have in
42. The term "sales transaction" is used to describe the general exchange of
benefits, in addition to exchanges of money for property. For example, the
granting of a stadium and tax benefits by a municipality to attract a profes-
sional sports franchise is a sales transaction.
43. Assuming that persons in a transaction are sane, somewhat intelligent
and not compelled to participate, a person will not participate in a sales trans-
action if she has no need. Since A's need to sell and X's need to buy is never
zero or below, because they would then not participate in the transaction, A
and X. are always above zero. The variable "k" actually represents the differ-
ence between the purchaser's emotional necessity to buy and the seller's emo-
tional necessity to sell, thus k=k,-k.
Notice that there is a difference between the words "necessity" and "need."
Necessity is used to describe the emotional quotient that enters into every sales
transaction. Necessity, which is based upon personality and emotion, may be
different for two individuals in the exact same position. However need is used
to describe the comparison between a party's competition and substitutable al-
ternatives. Need will be the same for all similarly situated persons because it is
solely a mathematic determination.
44. Par exists at the numerical value of one. A need greater than par
would be above the value one, and a need less than par would have a numerical
value below one.
[Vol. 9:691698
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the same position: A's need equals X's need. 45 The paradigm par
sale occurs when there are equal amounts of substitutable alter-
natives as competitors, both on the sellers' and purchasers'
sides.
Now assume there is one party, X, that is interested in
purchasing A's property. These are A's substitutable alterna-
tives.46 Also assume there are five properties for sale that will
suit X's purposes-these are A's competitors. 47 A's competition
is greater than A's substitutable alternatives so A's need is
above par. In this case, the numerical representation of A
would be above 1, possibly 1.2. 48 Alternatively, X's need to buy
A's property is less than par because X's competition is less than
X's substitutable alternatives. The numerical representation of
X's need is below 1, possibly 0.8.49 Finally, assume that A's emo-
tional necessity to sell is the same as X's emotional necessity to
buy. Thus, the price to be paid by X for A's property is
P(n)=c(Q-8 ) where k=kx-ka=O
2.
p=2c.
-3
Logically, the price is drastically below par value, in fact two-
thirds par value, because A's need to sell to X is greater than X's
need to buy from A.
45. Thus, par is represented by Xn=An.
46. "Competition" is the term this Note uses to describe one party's compe-
tition for another's business, while "substitutable alternatives" is the term this
Note uses to describe the latter party's competition for the former party's busi-
ness. For example, a seller's substitutable alternatives are all those who she
believes want to buy her property. A seller's competition is all those who she
believes are selling property similar to hers.
47. The seller's substitutable alternatives and the purchaser's competition
are often not the same. Substitutable alternatives and competition must be
viewed from the perspective of the party and not with general omniscience. For
example, A owns a rare book. X, a pirate, wants to buy a rare book. A only
wants to sell the book to a pirate. A's substitutable alternatives are other pi-
rate interested in buying the book. However, X's competition may be all pro-
spective purchasers of rare books, a group larger than the actual competition
(and the substitutable alternatives). Thus, it is easy to see that knowledge
about the specifics of the substitutable alternatives and competition may deter-
mine eventual price. The greater the parties knowledge about her and the
other's needs in respect to the other party's knowledge the better price she will
receive. Often the universe for one term is different than the universe for the
other, but the two always overlap for at least one case, where the transaction is
possible to occur.
48. The number "1.2" is for example only and may not correspond to the
actual value of A's need.
49. See supra note 48.
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In practice, this equation is unhelpful because it oversimpli-
fies the actual pricing phenomenon and does not address how to
quantify each party's need.50 In most transactions there are not
just two participants, but many. Each participant engages with
the others for many different properties. This leads to many po-
tential sales transactions as different purchasers and sellers in-
teract. Therefore, A's need to sell the property (An) and X's need
to buy the property (Xn) should be further examined. The par-
ties' needs can be determined by comparing the substitutable al-
ternatives and competition for those substitutables, including
the competition for A's property.
The seller's need may be represented by the ratio of A's sub-
stitutable alternatives (purchasers), Sa, and A's competition
(other sellers), Ta.51 Therefore,
ATa
Alternatively the purchaser's need, X,, is the ratio of X's substi-
tutable alternatives (sellers), S., and X's competition (other pur-
chasers), Tx. Therefore,
X=T.
ns.
The property sale price equation from above is then completed
as such,
T
P(x,a)=c( +k).
Ta
Sa
C. DEFINING RENT-SEEKING MATHEMATICALLY: A RETURN TO
FIRST PRINCIPLES
The price equation isolates the rent-seeking phenomenon.
When A chooses to attract a particular purchaser, X, she can
T,
increase X's need, 7 by either decreasing X's perception of the
50. The terms substitutable alternatives and competition are used in the
above analysis however are not defined until now in an attempt to break down
and simplify the process.
51. The term par is also used in this context for when the substitutable
alternatives equal the competition. Again par is numerically represented by
the value 1. See supra note 44.
700 [Vol. 9:691
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substitutable alternatives for A's property, from X's perspective,
S., or increasing X's perception of competition for A's property,
T.. There are many ways A can accomplish this, including low-
ering the asking price or making capitol improvements without
increasing price. If there are several sellers competing for a par-
ticular X's business, and X can only purchase from a portion of
the selling As, rent-seeking comes into play. The selling As will
compete to make their properties more and more beneficial and
X will buy from the A who makes X's cost the lowest. 52 If
enough As compete, X's purchase price may be well below the
par value of the property approaching the elimination of margi-
nal gains.53
This definition is functional and retains the principles of the
earlier scholarship. Individuals will commit resources where
they produce the greatest profit 54 and invest resources in at-
tempts to form monopolies until the marginal cost equals the
properly discounted return.55 Here, the seller is taking advan-
tage of the rent-seeking theory to attract a purchaser. Also, eco-
nomic equations can represent this phenomenon, 56 a basic
premise of the preceding subpart. And finally, the operation of
the rent-seeking theory in a particular system depends on the
level of restriction in that system57 and these behaviors are evi-
denced by bureaucratic institutions. 58 Professional sports
franchises are bureaucratic institutions in highly restricted
industries.
In summary, every sale can be characterized by an equation
that equates price paid with the purchaser's need to buy, divided
by seller's need to sell, plus the difference of the parties' emo-
tional necessity, times a translation coefficient. The seller's
need to sell and the purchaser's need to buy can each be deter-
mined by the quotient of the substitutable alternatives and com-
petition affecting each party. By manipulating the seller's or
purchaser's need equations a seller can attract a purchaser to a
particular property in lieu of other sellers' property. In turn,
purchasers will seek the most attractive buying opportunity-
the one that will allow for the greatest profit margin. A seller
will use that tendency to attract purchasers.
52. See supra notes 20, 35 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 20-40 and accompanying text.
54. See Tullock, supra note 19.
55. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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II EXAMINING FRANCHISE COMPETITION: A VIEW TO
SPORTS POLICY
This Part examines the Toronto Blue Jays' and Montreal
Expos' success, or lack thereof, with reference to the competi-
tiveness of other sports franchises in Canada, resulting in the
conclusion that Canadian franchises are not competitive.
Although this Part focuses on baseball, the other major interna-
tional American sports franchises located in Canada are not im-
mune from the competitive disadvantage problem.5 9 This Note
focuses on the Major League Baseball (MLB) teams because
they are the oldest existing continuous United States profes-
sional sports franchises in Canada and have the most reported
information.
MLB arrived in Canada when Montreal was awarded a
baseball team in 1969 for a $13 million franchise fee.60 Toronto
was awarded a franchise in 1977 for $7 million.6 1 Between 1969
and 1995, Montreal won 2148 games and lost 2200 games, for a
.494 win-loss percentage, and won two division champion-
ships.62 Between 1977 and 1995, Toronto won 1499 games and
lost 1561 games, for a .490 win-loss percentage, and won five
division championships.6 3 In 1990-1991, Toronto made $20.1
million in profits on $83.1 million in revenue, while Montreal
made $1.1 million in profits on $37.4 million in revenue.6 4 A
team's revenue earned is directly related to the team's winning
percentage.65 However, it is unclear whether athletic competi-
tiveness leads to fiscal competitiveness, or vice versa.66 In any
case, Montreal had the lowest revenue in baseball in 1990-
1991.67 Whatever success either team may have had in any par-
ticular year, the fact that neither team has an overall record
59. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
60. See FRANK P. JOzSA, JR. & JOHN J. GUTHRIE, JR., RELOCATING TEAMS
AND EXPANDING LEAGUES IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 49 (1999).
61. See id. at 46.
62. See ROSENTRAUB, supra note 1, at 334. The championships may be ex-
plained as an anomaly because both division championships were during strike
seasons (1981, 1994). See id.
63. See id. at 346.
64. See GERALD W. SCULLY, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF SPORTS 118 (1995).
Note that Montreal had the lowest revenue although eleven teams are located
in United States cities with a population smaller than Montreal's and seven
teams had a win-loss record worse than Montreal's. See id. at 119.
65. See SCULLY, supra note 64, at 68-69.
66. This Note will not determine which contributes to the other in what
situations because it is a "chicken and the egg" problem.
67. See SCULLY, supra note 64, at 119.
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above .500 indicates that, in general, Canadian teams lose.6s
Therefore, athletically and economically, the Canadian
franchises have not demonstrated an ability to compete.
The other United States sports corporations with Canadian
franchises have evidenced much of the same problem. The Na-
tional Hockey League's (NHL) Ottowa Senators will relocate to
the United States to avoid Canadian taxes, which caused the
team to lose $7 million during the 1997-98 season. 69 The Na-
tional Basketball Association (NBA) restrictions on high-end
salaries damage the Vancouver Grizzlies ability to attract and
keep talent.70  In 1998, basketball player Kendall Gill
threatened to retire if he was traded to the NBA's Toronto Rap-
tors. Similarly, after being traded to Toronto, Kenny Anderson
refused to report to his new team.71 Damon Stoudamire and
Doug Christie, formerly of the Raptors, each forced a trade out of
Toronto.72 However, the inability to sign free agents is not lim-
ited to basketball franchises. Since 1985, at least 12 superstar-
caliber players have left the Montreal Expos to play for other
teams.73 To be competitive, sports franchises, like all other
businesses, must have the talent to succeed. The fact that Cana-
dian franchises have trouble keeping that talent, coupled with
their losing history and fiscal troubles, supports the conclusion
that United States sports franchises in Canada have problems
competing.
III EXPLAINING THE DISADVANTAGE: A CLOSER LOOK
AT SPORTS POLICY
A. EXAMINING COMPETITION: THE PAST EXPLANATIONS
Some commentators have opined that the competitive dis-
advantage can be explained by the following factors: perceived
distance of Canada, the frigid weather, low Canadian interest in
68. Year to year variances may be explained by good personnel moves,
players playing above their norm, good coaching, strikes etc. See supra note 62.
69. See Taxes Have Senators Considering Relocation, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Feb.
26, 1999, at 6.
70. See Inside Dish: Front Office Rumblings and Locker Room Whispers,
SPORTING NEWS, Nov. 30, 1998, at 92.
71. See David Moore, Disorder off the Court, SPORTING NEWS, March 2,
1998, at 29, 30.
72. See Bill Harris, Tax Situation Gets Break, TORONTO SUN, Feb. 28, 1998,
at S14.
73. Gary Carter, Andres Galarraga, Delino DeShields, Tim Wallach, Hubie
Brooks, Andre Dawson, Marquis Grissom, Larry Walker, Ken Hill, Mark Lang-
ston, Randy Johnson, and John Wettland. See ROSENTRAUB, supra note 1, at
337.
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United States sports, and the lack of municipal support.74 This
Note does not address the first two factors because Canada is
not significantly farther or colder than other cities with profes-
sional sports franchises. 75 The critics also claim that the tax
structure in Canada and the declining value of the Canadian
dollar also make it impossible for Canadian sports franchises to
be competitive. 76 Other arguments are that Canadian govern-
ments are more reluctant then their United States counterparts
to assist teams in building stadiums, United States govern-
ments award property tax waivers to teams where Canadian
teams pay full taxes, and the level of personal and property
taxes makes Canada less attractive to players. 77 One commen-
tator says that "[there are 29 teams in the NBA, and each of
them competes on the same size floor and the same basket, but
there is economic disparity because of the currency and taxes in
Canada. You can't have 27 teams playing on one field and two
on a slanted field."78 The argument continues that there is a
difference between the treatment of professional sports
franchises in Canada and in the United States,
since the Reagan administration slashed the top rate for federal per-
sonal income tax from 50 percent to 39.6 percent in 1983, pro athletes
in major league baseball, the NBA and the NHL have balked at play-
ing for Canadian teams because of the higher tax rate and lesser value
of the Canadian dollar.7 9
Furthermore,
[wihen Toronto was awarded a [NBA] franchise five years ago, Reve-
nue Canada interpreted its tax code so that players who didn't main-
74. See David DuPree, Anderson Might Nix Raptors-Blazers Deal, USA To-
DAY, Feb. 16, 1998, at 8C.
75. The distance between: New York, New York and Toronto, Ontario is
347 miles; between New York and Montreal, Quebec is 334 miles; between Los
Angeles, California and Toronto is 2183; and between Los Angeles and Mon-
treal is 2475. This should be compared to the distance between New York and
Los Angeles (2462 miles). How Far Is It? (last visited March 17, 2000)<httpi/
www.indo.com/distance/>. The average low January temperature in: Minneap-
olis, Minnesota is -9' F; Milwaukee, Wisconsin is -P F; Detroit, Michigan is 60
F; Toronto, Ontario is 1' F; and Montreal, Quebec is 70 F. Excite Travel Fact
Sheet (last visited March 17, 2000) <http'//www.excite.com/travel/regions/
north-america/>.
76. See Roscoe Nance, Many Players Balk at Canadian Taxes, USA TODAY,
Feb. 17, 1998, at 10C.
77. See Al Strachan, The American Experience: Because of the Crippling
Level of Canadian Taxes, Players Will Accept Less In Real Dollars to Play in the
United States, TORONTO SuN, April 29, 1999, at H3.
78. Canadian Tax Bite Irritates NBA Players, Cm. TRIBUNE, Feb. 15, 1998,
at C12 (Chicagoland edition).
79. Mark Asher, A Taxing Situation; Playing in Canada May Impact Fran-
cis Financially, WASH. POST, July 27, 1999, at D03.
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tain a permanent residence in Canada would have to pay the heavier
Canada taxes on roughly 50% of their salaries, based on the fact that
half of their games are played there. But last spring the tax code was
reinterpreted, and players began to be taxed for each day they worked
in Canada, meaning for games and practices. They then paid Cana-
dian taxes on about 65% of their salary.
8 °
In summary, all of the major criticism falls into one cate-
gory: that the Canadian government's policy and the Canadian
public opinion create the disadvantage.
B. EXAMINING COMPETITION: REFUTING THE PREVIOUS
EXPLANATIONS
The explanations in subpart A depend on uncited, signifi-
cant distinctions between the Canadian and United States social
and political systems. However, no such distinction exists. If
the systems are similar with respect to professional sports, then
there must be some other reason the taxes and other economic
disadvantages are different.
Upon comparison of the two countries, the argument that
the political structure of one is clearly more conducive to locat-
ing a successful professional sports franchise is erroneous. The
governments are very similar in structure and policy. The Ca-
nadian political system is based upon parliamentary sovereignty
and a federalism system,8 ' while the ITnited States system is
based upon separation of powers8 2 and federalism.8 3 The Cana-
dian authority is split between the centralized federal govern-
ment and the provinces, with federal superiority where
concurrent jurisdiction exists.84 The Cabinet links the Parlia-
ment to the Bureaucracy and local government is created by the
provinces.85 Local government is a mix of unitary and two-
tiered local authorities and specialist boards.86 A powerful in-
terest group policy community moderated by the central role of
the Cabinet and the legitimating role of the Parliament best
characterizes the Canadian political process.8 7 Since the late
80. Jackie MacMullan, Inside the NBA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, March 2,
1998, at 118.
81. See British North America Act of 1867.
82. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III.
83. See U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X.
84. See BARRIE HoULIHAN, SPORT, POLICY AND POLITICS 32 (1997).
85. See id. at 32, 33.
86. See id. at 118.
87. See id. at 38.
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1960s "the Canadian government has provided substantial fi-
nancial and organizational support for sport."88
Similarly, the United States federal authority is split into
executive,8 9 legislative,90 and judicial branches.91 The states
are granted all "powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution"92 and most are structured similarly to the fed-
eral government.93 The powers of local government are com-
pletely granted by the governing state and typically include city
and county subgovernments. 94 The general characteristic of
United States local government is its fragmentation of adminis-
trative units.95 The fragmentation and complexity of the United
States system increases the number of clearance points for pol-
icy and the tendency towards incrementalism. 96 Finally, "the
overriding themes of sport in America are class, social integra-
tion and commercialism." 97 Therefore, there are no differences
between United States and Canadian sports policy or govern-
ment structure that would explain the professional sports com-
petitive disadvantage.
Nor can the government behaviors explain the competitive
difference. 98 Originally, there was tremendous public sector sup-
port for the attraction of a MLB team to Canada. In 1994, Mon-
treal and Toronto had populations of about 3.3 million and 4.3
million, respectively, showing a strong consumer base.99 The
two most expensive single site sports projects in North America,
the Montreal Expos's Olympic Stadium and the Toronto Blue
Jays's Skydome, are found in Canada. 100 The two facilities cost
the Canadian government in excess of $1.625 billion Cana-
dian.1 1 Canada's great national debt, Quebec's provincial debt,
88. Id. at 36.
89. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
90. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
91. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
93. See HouLmAN, supra note 84, at 53.
94. See id. at 54.
95. See id. at 138.
96. See id. at 58.
97. Id. at 55.
98. This Note acknowledges the difference between government policy and
structure and government behavior. Policy and structure are formal, while be-
havior is not.
99. See ROSENTRAUB, supra note 1, at 327. The provinces of Quebec (Mon-
treal) and Ontario (Toronto) had populations of about 7.3 million and 11 mil-
lion, respectively, in 1995. See id.
100. See id. at 321.
101. See id.
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and the fact that the residents of Montreal still pay a tax for the
construction of Olympic Stadium make it very unlikely that the
Expos will receive any public sector support for a new sta-
dium, 0 2 not because of the political or legal structure, but be-
cause of fiscal constraints.-0 3
In Toronto, where the oft-delayed l0 4 and greatly over-
budget 0 5 Skydome was built for the Blue Jays, public sector
support for the team has also neared economically feasible lim-
its. Funding for the stadium was originally $60 million (Cana-
dian) public tax share, $30 million (Canadian) invested by the
province, $30 million (Canadian) invested by the city, and 30
private corporations investing $5 million (Canadian) each.' 0 6
The private corporations would share in any stadium profits but
the public-sector partners would account for all cost overruns. 10 7
Unfortunately, the stadium never generated enough revenue to
pay off its debt, let alone create profit, thus the public-sector
partners were still paying $60,000 (Canadian) a day in interest
alone until they sold their share in the stadium to private par-
ties in 1992.108 Therefore, there was significant Canadian mu-
nicipal participation in attracting and supporting the
professional sports franchises.
Even if the policies or governmental structures were differ-
ent, the resulting competitive data does not support a claim that
the structure, policy, or behavior is to blame. Assuming that the
distinctions between the Canadian and United States political
arena explain the competitive disadvantage, any team in the
United States would be better off than any team in Canada.
However, there are five United States franchises whose competi-
tive ranking is equal to or lower than both Toronto's and Mon-
102. But see Jim Souhan, Team Paints Picture of Progress, STAR TRIBUNE,
March 16, 2000, at C1 (explaining how the Expos' new owner plans on building
a new stadium, possibly with public support, and spending more money on
players).
103. See ROSENSTRAUB, supra note 1, at 341.
104. See id. at 348. Ontario's premier, William Davis, appointed a three-
person committee to determine the site for the stadium in mid-1983 and the
dome opened in mid-1989. See id.
105. See id. at 348, 351. Initial budget proposals were approximately $150
million (Canadian) and the final cost is estimated at $628 million (Canadian).
See id.
106. See id. at 349.
107. See ROSENSTRAUB, supra note 1, at 350.
108. See id. at 351-54.
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treal's.109 Therefore, any argument that explains the Canadian
franchise competitive disadvantage by drawing a distinction be-
tween the two Country's political structure and sports policies is
misleading.
C. EXPLAINING THE PROBLEM: APPLYING DIFFERENTIAL RENT-
SEEKING
As discussed above, rent-seeking does not occur in a vac-
uum.110 Rather, it occurs in multi-dimensional layers. On the
whole, it is best described as an onion. Each layer contributing
to and building on the other. When the layers are individual, it
is unidentifiable, but when together the onion is apparent. The
onion can be sliced across the layers to isolate particular tenden-
cies, like the sweet flesh near the top or the juicy matter near
the middle. One of these rent-seeking slices is "differential rent-
seeking." Differential rent-seeking occurs when multiple com-
petitors benefit from different rent-seeking schemes because of
different situations surrounding their individual sales
transactions.1 1 1
For example, using the rent-seeking equation presented
supra in subpart II.C, X and Y are purchasers of A's product. X
lives on the West Coast of the United States and Y lives on the
East Coast. X purchases A's product in 1995 and Y purchases it
in 1997. A's product sales on the West Coast in 1995 have no
competition, but A's product sales on the East Coast in 1997
have several competitors. For simplicity, it can be assumed that
there are no substitutable alternatives for A's product, that X
and Y are the only purchasers of the product, that A, X, and Y
have the same knowledge, that the emotional necessity equa-
tions for X and Y in respect to A are equal, and that the product
is essentially the same on the West Coast in 1995 as it is on the
East Coast in 1997.112 The rent-seeking equations will look as
such:
109. See JozsA, supra note 60, at 139 (The rank is determined by adding
performance, attendance and value. Minnesota, Kansas City and San Diego
are ranked below Toronto and Montreal; Milwaukee is tied with Montreal).
110. See discussion supra Part I.
111. Again this Note is using sale/price terminology to describe the situation
generally. See supra notes 38, 42.
112. Therefore in 1995 on the West Coast X's substitutable alternatives for
A's product equal A's competition, because there are none of either. Conversely,
A's substitutable alternatives for X's purchase equal X's competition, because
there are also none of either. Of course, X's substitutable alternatives then
equal X's competition and A's substitutable alternatives equal A's Competition.
In 1997 on the East Coast A's substitutable alternatives and Y's competition
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.T.
P(x,a)=c(_ +k) where Sx=Tx=Sa=Ta,
P(y,a)=c(I +k) where Sy=T, 1>Ty=S O.
T.
The two equations each represent a different layer in the rent-
seeking onion. The comparison of the two layers is the slicing of
the onion. These equations may be simplified as such:
P(x,a)=c(l+k).
P(y,a)=c( 1 +k), where r>1.
Therefore, P(y,a) is smaller than P(x,a)1 3 which means that the
price paid by X for A's product will be higher than the price paid
by Y for A's product. This is logical, because if all else is equal,
the purchaser purchasing when A has no competition will pay a
higher price than one purchasing when A has competition.
This equation isolates the problem of differential rent-seek-
ing. Assume, in this limited context, that X and Y are competi-
tors and that the price charged by A remains the same so long as
a purchaser purchases from her. Since the price paid by X is
higher than the price paid by Y, Y has an advantage in creating
a greater profit margin. Y may either charge the same price as
X and receive more profit, or charge less than X and receive
more market share.114 X therefore has a continuing competitive
disadvantage.
The differential rent-seeking theory is supported by the
principle rent-seeking theories discussed earlier.115 Rent-seek-
ing can be viewed by equations representing supply versus de-
mand and potential returns versus resource investment. 1 6 The
price equation asserted in this Note does just that. It uses sub-
stitutable alternatives and competition to determine the supply
are also equal with the A-X situation, but Y's substitutable alternatives and A's
competition, are equal at a higher value.
113. Assuming Y's emotional necessity to by A's product is not so much
greater than X's as to override the need factors.
114. Note that this assumes the operating costs for the two persons are simi-
lar. Additionally, the choice of whether to increase profits or market may not be
mutually exclusive.
115. See discussion supra Part I.A.
116. See supra notes 19, 34 and accompanying text.
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and demand and results in a "price" which is just the return on
resource investment. Under the price equation, a person is will-
ing to invest resources in attempts to achieve a profit until the
price exceeds the potential profit. In the case of differential
rent-seeking, supply is restricted by quantitative restrictions,
and persons expend resources to compete for the limited sup-
ply.117 Any program that creates rent-seeking will be more diffi-
cult to modify or repeal, thus differential rent seeking will be a
continuing disadvantage. And finally, because institutions be-
have like rent-seeking individuals, the fact that franchises and
corporations are discussed does not change the dynamic. 118
Therefore, differential rent-seeking is supported by the afore-
mentioned scholarship. 19
The theory of differential rent-seeking can be used to ex-
plain why the Canadian franchises of United States sports
leagues have a competitive disadvantage versus their United
States counterparts. The significant rent-seeking problem in
professional sports is that the sports corporations have inadver-
tently adjusted the "needs" in the price equation discussed in
Part I.C.120 Part II.C merely lists the symptoms of the disease.
During expansion, the sports corporation will place a franchise
where it believes the corporation will receive the most benefit.12 '
117. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
118. See Faith, supra note 31, at 332.
119. Ann 0. Krueger spoke of a continuum of rent-seeking, from strictly lim-
ited to completely free. Differential rent-seeking merely states that in certain
competitive atmospheres on business can be closer to one side of the spectrum
while another business is near the other. See supra notes 24-30 and accompa-
nying text.
120. The league itself sometimes creates limitations that affect the price
equation.
The real issue is how we can protect our cities from blackmail by vaga-
bond sport franchises playing the cities and their taxpayers against
each other. This is a problem we face in all professional sports. Even
baseball, which boasts of its franchise stability courtesy of its non stat-
utory [antitrust] exemption, frequently uses the threat of relocation to
negotiate lucrative stadium deals at taxpayer expense.
[. . .I
Unfortunately, I have seen precious little indication that the NFL or
other sports leagues are willing to do anything to respond to the prob-
lem. Instead, the leagues have created a chronic shortage of
franchises ....
Professional Sports Franchises Relocation: Antitrust Implications: Hearing
before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 4 (1996) (statement of
John Conyers, ranking minority member of Judiciary Committee).
121. There are several factors that must go into determining where to locate
a franchise including profitability and league exposure. This Note combines all
those factors into a net benefit to the corporation.
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When there were no franchises, the corporation was able to lo-
cate teams anywhere limited only by clearly apparent economic
feasibilities. However, as the leagues grow, the level of benefit
each potential expansion city offers decreases. 122 As the benefit
each city can offer dips below the level of competitiveness, that
city ceases to be in the running for an expansion franchise.
Therefore, once a league has significantly expanded, the number
of cities competing to woo a franchise decreases. With that de-
crease of competition comes a decrease in rent-seeking benefit
awarded to each franchise, resulting in differential rent-seeking.
With the change in geographic wealth distribution, some
franchises are able to rent-seek more freely than others. 123
Again, an example best illustrates the phenomenon. A pro-
fessional sports corporation decides to expand in two phases, one
new team in 1990 (franchise X) and two new teams in 2000
(franchises Y and Z). City A is competing with cities B and C for
franchise X. No other cities can compete for the franchise. As-
suming that each city is exactly the same and every party knows
all the pertinent details of the expansion, the price equation for
the expansion may look like this,
P(x,a)=P(x, b)=P(x,c).
The substitutable alternatives and competition for city A are
equivalent because cities B and C are the same as A. The need
of each city is equal. However, in reality, each city will not be
the same and each may not know of the other's situation. Simi-
larly, the seller, the expanding professional sports corporation,
may not be completely aware of the entire circumstances. For
example, A and B may know of the second phase of expansion
while C does not. Since they realize that every city will receive a
team their need and X's need, in respect to them, is different
than C's need and X's need in respect to C. Thus, the hierarchy
may look like this:
T C > >l a Tb >0
Sc Sa Sb
122. The decrease can also be accounted to rent-seeking. Remember cities
behave like a rent-seeking individual and each franchise is just like a license
where a quantitative restriction exists. See discussion supra Part I.A. Where a
city's competition decreases because of previous expansion, the price it has to
pay proportionally decreases. See discussion supra Part I.C.
123. Even if only one city is potentially competitive, rent-seeking is probably
not eliminated because several different ownership groups may compete for the
franchise even though the region is already determined.
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Therefore,
P(x,c)>P(x,a), P(xb).
The price paid by city C to the franchise will be greater than the
price paid by cities A and B. Rent-seeking dictates that the
franchise will then be located in city C, because that is where it
will derive the most benefit. However, in 2000, when the second
round of franchises are granted, cities A and B will be awarded
franchises at a lower cost, because the competition between cit-
ies is nominal and the substitutable alternatives are limited.
Therefore, franchises Y and Z will not receive the same benefit
received by franchise X and will not be able to compete.
The problem then created is that the franchises benefiting
from limited rent-seeking may be at a disadvantage vis-&-vis
those franchises with less restricted rent-seeking.124 This, not
the tax or municipal participation differences, is why Canadian
franchises of American sports corporations cannot compete with
their American counterparts. When MLB decided to expand to
Canada in 1969 and 1977, those franchises did not receive the
full benefit of rent-seeking. This created a continuing deficiency
in the profitability of those franchises versus their counterparts
in the United States. 125 Therefore, Canadian sports franchises
cannot compete because of their restricted ability to rent-seek
when first inducted into the corporation.
Though the theory is powerful, superior management deci-
sions overrule differential rent-seeking. Teams often like to use
their financial troubles as an excuse for poor performance; some-
times it is nothing more than that-an excuse. 126 This is sup-
124. Of course this phenomenon is not limited to Canadian franchises.
United States franchises are also disadvantaged by differential rent-seeking
and overexpansion, the extent of which depends on the factors that contribute
to differential rent-seeking. However, the public opinion, refuted by this Note,
is that there is something fundamentally different about the Canadian
franchises that make them losers.
125. An example of the continuing disadvantage is that several changes
aimed at remedying the problem have been proposed including changes to the
sports' rules, Canadian law and government support of sports teams yet little
assistance has been provided. See Bill Harris, Canadian Teams Taxed by
Taxes: NBA Must Offset Vast Difference in Laws Says Agent, TORONTO SUN, Feb.
3, 1998, at 67; Taking One for Our Teams: Ottawa Recommends Federal Aid for
Pro Franchises, TORONTO SUN, October 3, 1998, at S5; Hockey Committee Wants
to Lower Canadian Taxes, STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, December 4, 1998, at 40;
See also Canada To Aid Ailing Franchises, STAR TRIBUNE, January 19, 2000, at
C3 ("The Canadian government announced Tuesday that it is prepared to pro-
vide up to $2 million to each of the country's six NHL franchises each year .... ").
126. See Al Strachan, Strachan on Hockey, TORONTO SN, December 27,
1998, at SP9.
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ported by empirical data interpreted by a complex function of
team efficiencies.127 Under this formula, teams are assessed to
be from well-managed to poorly-managed. 128 A well-managed
team may be able to overcome the effects of adverse differential
rent-seeking, while a poorly-managed team may lose despite
favorable differential rent-seeking.
The differential rent-seeking theory explains the root of the
problem better than earlier theories' because it offers a response
to the other explanations' inherent question: "Why doesn't the
city that wants the franchise give benefits to make up for the
disadvantage?" 129 This can not be answered by the prior expla-
nations, but is answered by differential rent-seeking. Differen-
tial rent-seeking states that the laws of economics, more
powerful than man-made laws, drove the price for the franchises
so low that neither municipalities nor the corporations were
compelled to accommodate the new franchises, leaving them at a
competitive disadvantage.
CONCLUSION
The ebb and flow of economic feasibility for professional
sports franchises is responsible for the Canadian franchises'
competitiveness problems. Rent-seeking behavior has created a
discrepancy between Canadian sports franchises and some of
their United States counterparts because the expansion into
Canada limited the benefits granted to the Canadian franchises
in respect to those United States counterparts. This differential
rent-seeking has created an ongoing disadvantage because the
benefit margin granted to the Canadian franchises is smaller
than that granted to some franchises in the United States.
Without significant change, the Canadian franchises will always
be at a competitive disadvantage that can be temporarily over-
come only by superior management decisions.
127. In WPi=po+,61 In SLGi+fi2 In BAj+,% In SB+i,4 In FP+05 In ERA +el. The
equation takes into account each team's winning percentage (WP), batting aver-
age (BA), slugging percentage (SLG), stolen bases (SB), fielding percentage (FP)
and earned run average (ERA) from the 1982-1993 seasons. See BASEBALL Eco-
NOMICS 194 (John Fizel et al. eds., 1996).
128. See id. at 197-98.
129. Differential rent-seeking provoked by overexpansion is a subtle but
powerful disadvantage that is not apparent when a municipality is awarded a
franchise. Because it is almost unnoticeable, it is rarely compensated for. In
contrast, the socio-political answers would be obvious, and probably compen-
sated for up front.
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